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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Marvin Gordon Grotto appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver, claiming the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Boise Police Department neighborhood contact officer, Steve Keely, went 
to Grotto's home at approximately 4:00 p.m. to follow-up on a tip he received 
regarding a concern that there was "drug sales or activity" occurring there. 
(10/10/2014 Tr., p.7, Ls.23-24, p.8, Ls.23-25, p.9, Ls.1-16, p.25, L.22 - p.26, 
L.4.) The reporting party "described frequent foot traffic and vehicle traffic in and 
out of the trailer that stayed for a short amount of time." (10/10/2014 Tr., p.9, 
Ls.16-18.) There had been a similar "complaint prior to that as well." 
(10/10/2014 Tr., p.9, Ls.19-20; see also p.29, L.25 - p.30, L.13.) When Officer 
Keely, accompanied by Officer Will Reimers, arrived at Grotto's house, there was 
"very loud" music playing and Officer Keely had to knock several times and "a 
little harder than normal" before Grotto answered. (10/10/2014 Tr., p.9, L.21 -
p.10, L.20, p.53, L.8 - p.54, L.5, p.64, Ls.1-7; Exhibit 1, 01 :00-02:03.) After 
Grotto answered, Officer Keely, who was in uniform, asked if they could come in, 
and Grotto agreed. (10/10/2014 Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.11, L. 5, p.13, Ls.2-7, p.54, 
Ls.17-21; Exhibit 1, 02:20.) Officer Keely explained that they were there because 
they had received a tip concerning the amount of traffic at Grotto's house and the 
possibility that the traffic was related to drug activity. (10/10/2014 Tr., p.12, 
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Ls.21-23; Exhibit 03:10-03:40.) Grotto responded that he has "caretakers," a 
PSR worker, and therapists thaf regularly come to his home, and a few friends 
that occasionally visit. (Exhibit 1, 03:35, 03:45, 04:04, 04:30-04:33, 05:37-05:46.) 
Officer Keely asked Grotto if he occasionally smoked "weed."1 (Exhibit 1, 
04:54.) Grotto admitted he did but said it was "not an everyday deal." (Exhibit 1, 
04:54-04:58.) Officer Keely told Grotto the "easiest way to clean the complaint 
up" was to come talk to him and verify there was no "validity" to it, and he asked 
Crotto if he would "mind walking around with Officer Reimer just to make sure" 
there was not a "big grow" or "drugs all over the house." (Exhibit 1, 05:55-06: 17 .) 
Crotto answered, "I prefer not." (Exhibit 1, 06:18; 10/10/2014 Tr., p.15, L.25 -
p.16, L.3.) Officer Keely advised Crotto that if he just had a pipe or a "small 
amount," that was "no big deal," and would not result in an arrest. (Exhibit 1, 
06:19-07:17.) Officer Keely suggested they could just "deal with it" by having 
Crotto collect it. (Exhibit 1, 07:15; 10/10/2014 Tr., p.16, Ls.4-10.) Crotto said he 
would and "went to his bedroom," and "Officer Reimers followed him down the 
hallway" while Grotto "retrieved [a] marijuana pipe." (10/10/2014 Tr., p.16, Ls.10-
13.) Crotto, however, was "concerned about [Officer Reimers] corning into his 
bedroom," but "[t]hat was resolved by him agreeing to let Officer Reimers stand 
at the doorway versus enter[ing] his bedroom." (10/10/2014 Tr., p.16, L.23 -
p.17, L.8; see also p.18, Ls.4-6; Exhibit 1, 07:17-09:23.) 
1 Officer Keely testified that, when he entered Crotto's home, he noticed a sign 
on the wall that depicted a marijuana leaf and had "4:20" on it, which "is a typical 
word reference [for] drug activity or drug use." (10/10/2014 Tr., p.12, Ls.6-12; 
see also p.32, L.20 - p.34, L.7.) 
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After Grotto retrieved his marijuana pipe, Officer Keely told him he thought 
there was "a little bit more" there based on how nervous Grotto was and the way 
he was acting. (Exhibit 1, 12:20-12:46.) Grotto responded by going "back to the 
room" and getting "a canister or a tin that had green residue or small amounts of 
marijuana nuggets of some type." (10/10/2014 Tr., p.19, Ls.2-8.) Based on the 
marijuana and paraphernalia Grotto had provided to that point, Officer Keely 
again asked for consent to search, but Grotto declined. (10/10/2014 Tr., p.19, 
L.22 - p.20, L.2.) After further discussion, and Officer Keely's assurances that 
he did not intend to take Grotto to jail unless he found a "dead body," Grotto 
again got up and went to his bedroom and brought back "approximately an ounce 
of marijuana buds." (10/10/2014 Tr., p.20, L.5 - p.21, L.13; Exhibit 1, 14:29-
17:05.) 
After Grotto's third trip to his room to get contraband, Officer Keely 
repeated his suspicion that Grotto was still hiding something, particularly in his 
safe, which is where all of the other contraband Grotto retrieved was located. 
(10/10/2014 Tr., p.21, Ls.16-23, p.59, Ls.9-11; Exhibit 1, 17:09-18:00.) As 
before, during the course of the ensuing conversation, Grotto again went back to 
his bedroom; on this fourth trip, Grotto "brought back a small Ziploc baggies [sic] 
with a white crystal substance that appeared ... to be methamphetamine." 
(10/10/2014 Tr., p.21, L.16 - p.22, L.25.) After Grotto produced the 
methamphetamine, his demeanor became more relaxed, and he consented to a 
search by Officer Reimers. (10/10/2014 Tr., p.24, L.7 - p.25, L.6, p.59, L.15 -
p.60, L.7.) Officer Reimers' search uncovered only additional paraphernalia; he 
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not find more marijuana or methamphetamine. (10/10/2014 Tr., p.24, Ls.13-
The state charged Grotto with possession of a controlled substance, 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and possession of 
drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.6-8, 27-28, 33-34.) Grotto filed a motion to 
suppress, asserting the evidence seized by law enforcement was "done without 
probable cause, without a warrant or [Grotto's] consent, and without exigent 
circumstances." (R., p.43; see also pp.45-51 (brief in support of motion to 
suppress).) More specifically, Grotto argued that his consent to the search of the 
safe in his bedroom was not free and voluntary, and was the product of "duress 
and/or coercion." (R., pp.48-50.) The district court held a hearing on Grotto's 
motion after which it entered a written decision denying Grotto's request for 
suppression. (R., pp.64-73.) 
After the court denied Grotto's motion to suppress, Grotto entered into a 
binding plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to possession with 
intent to deliver and the state agreed to dismiss the other two charges. (R., 
pp.76-77.) The agreed-upon sentence was a suspended unified term of five 
years, with two years fixed. (R., p.77.) As part of the plea agreement, Grotto 
reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.77.) 
Consistent with the terms of the plea agreement, the district court imposed a 
suspended five-year sentence with two years fixed, from which Grotto filed a 
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.82-87, 94-95.) 
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ISSUE 
Crotto states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Crotto's motion to 
suppress when Mr. Crotto's consent to search the safe was 
involuntary based on the totality of the circumstances? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.12.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Crotto failed to establish that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress because the evidence presented at the suppression hearing 
supports the conclusion that Crotto's conduct was consensual as was Crotto's 
ultimate consent to search? 
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ARGUMENT 
Grotto Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Grotto contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
because, he claims, he "tried to withdraw his consent numerous times," and "also 
possessed such mental disabilities to make him incapable of providing voluntary 
consent under the circumstances." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Grotto further 
argues the officers "had knowledge of [his] incapacity" and "subtly coerce[d] [him] 
until he unwillingly gave in to the officers' demands." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) 
Grotto's claims fail. The district court correctly concluded, based on the evidence 
presented and the applicable legal standards, that Grotto's consent was not 
coerced, and Grotto was not entitled to suppression. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). 
Whether a consent to a search was voluntary is a question of fact, the 
determination of which is reviewed on appeal for clear error. State v. Reynolds, 
146 Idaho 466, 472, 197 P.3d 327, 333 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Stewart, 145 
Idaho 641, 648, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008). "Findings will not be 
deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence in the 
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." Stewart, 145 Idaho at 648, 181 P.3d at 1256 (quoting State v. Jaborra, 
143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App. 2006)). 
C. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denying 
Grotto's Motion To Suppress 
A necessary predicate to a claimed Fourth Amendment violation is the 
existence of an unconstitutional search or seizure. See State v. Jaborra, 143 
Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481, 484 (Ct. App. 2006) ("The Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches."). Most of the 
evidence seized from Grotto's residence was not, however, found pursuant to a 
search; rather, it was provided by Grotto. Thus, it is important to be clear about 
which evidence Grotto seeks to suppress and the basis for suppression. 
In his written motion, Grotto requested an order "suppressing any and all 
information and/or evidence that was obtained as a result of a search of [Grotto's] 
home." (R., p.43.) In his supporting memorandum, Grotto asserted he 
"inevitably capitulated to the [officers'] repeated requests to search his 
residence." (R., p.50.) The only search of Grotto's home, however, was when 
Grotto consented to a search, which included his safe, after he gave the officers 
paraphernalia, marijuana, and methamphetamine. On appeal, Grotto 
summarizes his complaint as follows: "In sum, Mr. Grotto contends that the 
totality of the circumstances demonstrate by substantial and competent evidence 
that his consent to search the safe was involuntary." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) 
This summation accurately reflects the only search that occurred. Thus, 
suppression of any evidence obtained before the search, i.e., the paraphernalia, 
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marijuana, and methamphetamine Grotto provided to Officers Keely and Reimers 
would not be subject to suppression. 
Grotto is also not entitled to suppression of the paraphernalia Officer 
Reimers found during his only search because that search was conducted 
pursuant to Grotto's consent. A warrantless search conducted pursuant to valid 
consent does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations omitted); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 
26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001 ). Consent is valid if it is free and voluntary. Schneckloth, 
412 U.S. at 225-26 (citations omitted). The voluntariness of an individual's 
consent is a question of fact to be determined based upon the totality of the 
circumstances. Varie, 135 Idaho at 852, 26 P.3d at 35 (citing Schnleckloth, 412 
U.S. at 248-49). In order to be valid, consent cannot be the result of duress or 
coercion, either direct or implied. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248. The mere 
presence of officers asking for consent to search is not sufficient, as a matter of 
law, to constitute improper police duress or coercion. See United States v. 
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). Nor does an "officer's truthful explanation that the 
officer could obtain a warrant" render consent involuntary. State v. Kapelle, 158 
Idaho 121, _, 344 P.3d 901, 909 (Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted). Instead, 
the court must consider all of the surrounding circumstances and find consent 
involuntary only if "coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a 
claim of lawful authority .... " State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 158, 657 P.2d 
17, 22 (1983) (emphasis original) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233). "The 
trial court is the proper forum for the 'careful sifting of the unique facts and 
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circumstances of each case' necessary in determining voluntariness." State v. 
Rector, 144 Idaho 643, 645, 167 P.3d 780, 782 (Ct. 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233). 
2006) (quoting 
With respect to the search, Crotto complains his consent was involuntary 
because of his "mental disability." (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-18.) In support of this 
argument, Crotto contends the district court erroneously found that Crotto 
"reference[d] his PSR worker just one time to explain away the frequent traffic in 
and out of his home." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) According to Crotto, he 
"repeatedly referenced his PSR worker to express his lack of sophistication, his 
inability to understand the situation, and his distress brought on by the officers' 
persistent questioning." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Crotto's argument misstates 
the district court's decision and the evidence presented at the suppression 
hearing. 
The district court's discussion of Crotto's references to his PSR worker 
reads as follows: 
It is true that early on in the encounter, the defendant 
mentioned having a PSR worker for "mental" problems, and later in 
the encounter expressed a desire to go to (what the Court 
understands to be) a mental health treatment facility, one with 
which the defendant obviously has some familiarity, given how 
quickly he stated its name to the officers in a state of high anxiety. 
However, the Court cannot agree that the officers took advantage 
of what they knew or believed to be the defendant's diminished 
capacities so as to coerce the defendant's consent, or that the 
defendant (objectively speaking) was unable to validly consent due 
to his mental condition(s). 
The defendant's reference to his PSR worker, taken in 
context, was clearly intended as a means of explaining to the 
officers why it might have appeared to the anonymous tipster that 
the traffic in and out of his home was consistent with drug-dealing, 
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rather than to inform the officers that the defendant was 
significantly mentally impaired for purposes of the investigation. In 
fact, it can be argued that the defendant's ready response to the 
officer's summation of the tipster's concerns (i.e. by incorporating 
the PSR workers' visits into his explanation for the traffic coming 
into and out of his house) showed considerable sophistication on 
the part of the defendant, and a more-than-adequate ability to 
understand the situation with which he was confronted. This 
inference, derived from the Court's review of the audio, is 
consistent with the testimony offered by the officers themselves, 
both of whom stated that the defendant seemed well able to 
understand the situation and to respond appropriately to the 
officers' questions, to include refusing numerous requests to search 
and expressing skepticism concerning the officers' veracity on a 
number of subjects. 
Viewing the encounter as a whole, there is simply no 
indication that the defendant's mental health condition(s) rendered 
him unable to validly consent to a search of the safe. There is also 
no indication that the officers did anything out of the ordinary, in 
terms of their investigative tactics, to take advantage of any mental 
health issues of the defendant (even assuming, arguendo, that they 
had any specific knowledge or beliefs concerning these issues). 
Rather, the evidence supports the officers' testimony that the 
defendant possessed adequate mental faculties, at the time of the 
encounter, to validly consent to the search of the safe. 
(R., pp.72-73.) 
Grotto quotes only the last paragraph of the district court's discussion on 
this point and appears to extrapolate from that, as well as the court's finding that 
Grotto referenced his PSR worker "to explain the frequent traffic in and out of his 
home," a "finding[]" that Grotto "reference[d] his PSR worker just one time." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.16.) While the district court clearly uses the singular form of 
the word "reference" in its discussion, it strains credulity to assert that this reflects 
a specific finding by the court that Grotto made only one reference to his PSR 
worker. When read as a whole, and in context, the district court's point was not 
that Grotto made a single reference, it was that Grotto referred to a PSR worker 
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to explain why he had a lot of traffic at his home. This finding is supported by the 
evidence. 
The audio of the interaction between Grotto and the officers reveals that 
Grotto mentioned his PSR worker, as well as other caregivers, in response to 
Officer Keely telling him about the nature of the complaint, which was based on 
the amount of traffic at Grotto's home. (Exhibit 1, 03: 10-05:46.) Grotto also 
made a later reference to his PSR worker in response to Officer Reimers saying 
something about people "coming and going" - again referring to the reported 
traffic at Grotto's home. (Exhibit 1, 11 :45-11 :49.) Finally, shortly before the 
officers left, Grotto said, "All the traffic is from my PSR workers, and caretakers 
and stuff, that's where the traffic is coming from." (Exhibit 1, 47:56-50:00.) 
Contrary to Grotto's argument on appeal, the district court did not clearly err in 
concluding that Grotto's reference to a PSR worker was to explain the traffic at 
his home. That Grotto made a few other references to a PSR worker does not 
show otherwise. 
Nor do Grotto's other references to a PSR worker support Grotto's claim 
that he made such references "to express his lack of sophistication, his inability 
to understand the situation, and his distress brought on by the officers' persistent 
questioning." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) For example, at one point Grotto told 
Officer Keely to "[g]et a hold of [his] PSR worker, or [his] caretaker or something." 
(Exhibit 1, 08:23.) Grotto's advice that Officer Keely should "[g]et a hold of [his] 
PSR worker" was not in response to any question; Grotto said that after Officer 
Keely said, "We're trying to work with ya." (Exhibit 1, 08:22-08:25.) Grotto's 
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desire to have Officer Keely contact the PSR worker could have been an 
invitation to corroborate explanation for traffic, but it was not an 
expression of a "lack of sophistication," "inability to understand the situation," or 
an apparent sign of distress. 
Grotto also contends that the audio also reflects him saying "Please, 
please, let my PSR [inaudible]." (Appellant's Brief, p.17 (citing Exhibit 1, 23:36-
23: 39).) The state cannot agree that this is an accurate recitation of what Grotto 
said. While the state can discern Grotto referencing his PSR worker after Officer 
Reimers tells him they can "re-explain" the possible option of obtaining a search 
warrant, the state is unable to hear Grotto say, "please, please, let my." 
Moreover, just as Grotto can be heard saying "PSR," Officer Keely is talking at 
the same time and telling Grotto: "To this point, Marvin, your friend is here and 
he can explain it as well. To this point we've worked on your consent, which 
means you've been cooperating even though you're bummed about giving up 
your weed and stuff, you've cooperated to this point with us." (Exhibit 1, 23:32-
23:49.) The Court need not decide precisely what Grotto said during this part of 
the interaction as it relates to Grotto's argument that his reference to a PSR 
worker was made for the purpose of showing he was unable "to understand the 
situation" (Appellant's Brief, p.16), because, regardless of any PSR worker, 
Grotto can be heard saying: "I don't understand all this" (Exhibit 1, 23:30). That 
said, Grotto's statement that he did not understand does not make it so. In fact, 
the evidence shows that the officers perceived otherwise. Both Officer Keely and 
Officer Reimers testified that nothing about Grotto's behavior suggested to them 
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that Grotto had any difficulty understanding their questions or was otherwise 
confused. (10/10/2014 , p.15, Ls.5-9, p.60, Ls.8-15.) Officer Keely specifically 
testified: 
... [H]e was very articulate. I believe he understood very clearly. 
And even to the point of mentioning wanting to leave to go to 
lntermountain. I felt that he was very cognitive and knew what he 
was doing and saying. Yeah, I didn't see it -- noticeable disability 
by any means that would make me think he was not capable to 
make those decisions on his own. 
(10/10/2014 Tr., p.23, L.24- p.24, L.6.) 
Contrary to Grotto's claims on appeal, the audio supports the district 
court's general characterization of the purpose of Grotto's reference to his PSR 
worker as "clearly intended as a means of explaining to the officers why it might 
have appeared to the anonymous tipster that the traffic in and out of his home 
was consistent with drug-dealing," and was not for the purpose of "inform[ing] the 
officers that [he] was significantly mentally impaired for purposes of the 
investigation." (R., p.72.) 
Grotto next asserts that, "[i]n addition to the repeated references to his 
PSR worker, [he] and his friend made other statements that established [his] 
mental disability." (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) In support of this argument, Grotto 
relies on (1) telling Officer Keely, "kind of mental," in response to Officer Keely 
asking what kind of disability Grotto had; (2) Grotto's friend telling Officer Keely 
that Grotto "was 'a head case,' had 'some mental issues, and was '[n]ot one 
hundred percent there"'; (3) Grotto asking to go to lntermountain because he 
could "not think"; and (4) Grotto telling the officers "he did not understand their 
explanation of the search warrant process." (Appellant's Brief, p.18 (citing 
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Exhibit 1, 4: 19-4:22, 12:50-13:30, 19:06-19:32, 20:18-20:27, 23:27-23:35) 
(brackets original).) According to Grotto, "[t]his evidence shows that Officers 
Keely and Reimers learned of [Grotto's] mental disability." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.18; see also p.16 ( claiming "Officers Keely and Reimers had knowledge of his 
mental disability").) Grotto's claim fails for two reasons. First, although Grotto 
argued at the suppression hearing that he has a mental disability, he did not 
present any actual evidence of such. (See Tr., p.69, L.15 - p.73, L.18, p.74, L.4 
- p.75, L.24.) Second, as noted, both Officer Keely and Officer Reimers testified 
to the contrary, denying that they "knew" Grotto was confused and did not 
understand what they were saying. (10/10/2014 Tr., p.15, Ls.5-9, p.60, Ls.8-15.) 
With respect to Grotto's reference to a PSR worker, Officer Keely testified that he 
did not know precisely what a PSR worker does, "other than assisting people 
with different types of issues that they might have." (10/10/2014 Tr., p.40, L.22 -
p.41, L.2.) Officer Keely also testified he has "seen people who had no 
disabilities assigned PSR workers." (10/10/2014 Tr., p.41, Ls.5-6.) That Grotto 
claimed to have a PSR worker and that his friend expressed an opinion that 
Grotto was a "head case" who had "mental issues" does not establish that 
Officers Keely and Reimers "knew" Grotto was mentally incapable of giving 
consent or responding to the officers' questions. Rather, this evidence only 
shows that Grotto said he had a PSR worker for "kind of mental" reasons, and 
Grotto's friend had certain opinions about Grotto's mental status. Officers are not 
required to accept such representations and opinions as fact, especially when 
their observations do not suggest any mental impairment that should give them 
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pause before proceeding with their investigation. See State v. Danney, 1 
405, 411, 283 P.3d 722, 728 1) ("the existence of alternative 
explanations does not necessarily negate reasonable suspicion"). Grotto's claim 
that the evidence established he has a mental disability, and that Officers Keely 
and Reimers were aware of such, fails. 
Grotto next argues: 
In addition to Mr. Grotto's vulnerable subjective state, Mr. 
Grotto's attempts to revoke consent show that his eventual consent 
to search the safe was involuntary. The district court found that Mr. 
Grotto knew that he could refuse consent to search based on the 
fact that Mr. Grotto "repeatedly refused to consent to direct 
requests by Officer Keely to search, and the officers honored is 
refusal." (R., p.71.) Mr. Grotto submits that these findings are 
clearly erroneous. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.19.) 
In support of this argument, Grotto claims "substantial and competent 
evidence shows that he did not know he could refuse to consent" because, he 
contends, Officers Keely and Reimers "ignored his attempts at revocation." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.19.) The alleged "attempts at revocation" Grotto relies on 
are all based on Grotto's "trip[s]" to the bedroom where he retrieved contraband 
for the officers, all of which proceeded his consent to search. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.19-20.) It is illogical to argue, as Grotto does, that he "attempt[ed]" to revoke 
consent before he ever gave it. 
After citing the applicable legal standards (R., p.68), the district court 
concluded that, "although police undoubtedly used sharp investigative tactics in 
order to coax the defendant into consenting to the search of his bedroom safe, 
the officers never strayed beyond the confines of the law (i.e. by coercing the 
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defendant's consent) in doing so, and hence the motion to suppress must be 
denied." (R., p.69.) Grotto has failed to show the district court erred. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
on Grotto's conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to deliver. 
DATED this 30th day of October, 2015. 
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